Crises in Russia: Contemporary Management Policy and Practice From a Historical Perspective by Boris Porfiriev & Greg Simons

Crises in Russia: Contemporary Management Policy and Practice From a Historical Perspective by Boris Porfiriev & Greg Simons

Author:Boris Porfiriev & Greg Simons [Porfiriev, Boris & Simons, Greg]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781409442288
Goodreads: 16686737
Publisher: Ashgate Publishing
Published: 2012-11-01T00:00:00+00:00


This statement gives no hint of the magnitude of the actual problem. In fact, it makes it seem that the problem is quite minor and being managed effectively by the navy. Events were later to show that this was far from the truth. However, for the most part, an information blockade existed and the Northern Fleet tried to exercise control by giving out limited information and denying media access. Although the naval base is a restricted area, some media personnel did manage to gain access to it. The paper that had published the names of the crew, Komsomolskaya Pravda, had managed to do so by bribing a naval officer with 18,000 roubles (US$650) for the list.17 In addition to the inability of the Russian navy to perform a successful rescue, further damage followed on the 18 of August. From an official point of view, the dramatic TV news footage of the mother of one of the sailors, Nadezhda Tylik, being sedated by officials was a total public relations disaster. She had been berating the Deputy Prime Minister, Ilya Klebanov, during a public meeting. When this footage was made public on 24 August, accusations flew that this was a blatant attempt by the authorities to stifle criticism. However, in a subsequent interview with The Times on August 29, Tylik stated that she was given the injection at the request of her husband for an existing medical condition, and was not forcibly injected as had been suggested in the media.18 Nevertheless, the image of the incident was damning and suggestive of a resort to Soviet-style tactics to stifle signs of public dissent.

The apparent inaction by Russia’s political leadership caused a reaction in the press, which was very critical of the perceived inertia. ORT (now called Perviy Kanal), a 51 per cent state-owned TV channel, was not even granted access to the site, let alone the independent and critical NTV, then owned by an oligarch who opposed the Putin administration, Vladimir Gusinsky (he was a supporter of Yuri Luzhkov and Evgeny Primakov, who had been unsuccessful in the presidential elections). Critical comments and features that appeared in the newspapers were telling. Moskovsky Komsomolets featured three pictures (of Sergeyev, Admiral Kuroyedov and Putin) with the caption “They don’t sink.” Even the normally pro-government Izvestia ran a photo of Putin in a naval hat with the comment: “False information about the tragedy of the Kursk is sinking the military’s reputation” (Burleson, 2002: 162–3). The mass media were particularly critical of the apparent lack of concern for the lives of the crew among leading political and military figures, and even media outlets regarded as being friendly to the Kremlin were not at all reserved in expressing this criticism.

The long-time news director and later president of NTV Oleg Dobrodeev left the station in early 2000. He was appointed by Putin to head RTR, a state channel. The station’s coverage of the Chechen War proved to be entirely loyal to the Kremlin. The level of trust Putin’s administration



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